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VALERIE J.M. BRADER*
Shell Games: Vicarious Liability of
State and Local Governments for
Insufficiently Protective Regulations
under the ESA
ABSTRACT
Lawsuits forcing states and local governments to enforce the
Endangered Species Act in lieu of federal regulation have met
with surprising success despite constitutional, statutory, and
regulatory obstacles. Instead of directly punishing individuals
who cause problems for endangered species, environmental
interest groups are often suing states and municipalities,
claiming state and local regulations are too lenient and therefore
"cause" individuals to harm endangered species. This article
concludes that the vicarious liability jurisprudence is too severely
flawed to maintain vitality. The statute and its implementing
regulations do not support it, the causation is too tenuous to
provide standing, and the ftderalism jurisprudence forbids it.
INTRODUCTION
Within the last decade, three federal circuit courts-the First,
Ninth, and Eleventh -have held that local and state governments violate
the Endangered Species Act (ESA) if their regulations do not sufficiently
restrain third-party actions that threaten endangered species. Because
this imposes liability on governments for the criminal actions of
individual constituents, the term "vicarious liability" is applied to
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describe the doctrine.' Courts have sought to remedy those "violations"
not simply by striking down state and local statutes, but by requiring
state and local governments to perform actions ranging from convening
working groups to closing beaches. In light of the contemporary
standing and federalism jurisprudence, as well as the structure of the
statute and its implementing regulations, it is startling that this
proposition has fared so well in federal courts. Examination of these
doctrines, the statute, the regulations, and administrative interpretations
of those regulations reveals that none of them offer a basis for allowing
the federal government to hold state and local governments liable for the
criminal acts of their constituents.
This article explores the potential weaknesses of the
governmental vicarious liability jurisprudence under the ESA, especially
in its application to state and local governments. After a summary of the
doctrine's development, the article begins by discussing the statutory
structure of the ESA, a structure that does not lend support to the
vicarious liability jurisprudence. The regulatory interpretation of the Act
and the informal guidance issued by federal agencies are then explored;
very little support for vicarious liability exists here either. Finally, the
article discusses constitutional obstacles to vicarious liability, including
issues of standing (both injury in fact and redressability) and issues of
commandeering.
HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE: THE EMERGENCE OF VICARIOUS
LIABILITY
The doctrine of vicarious liability has its roots in cases that are
not strictly about "vicarious" liability at all, because no third-party action
was necessary to cause harm to the species. Instead, in the two decisions
that are often cited as the origins of the theory of vicarious governmental
liability under the ESA, the government's own affirmative actions taken
as part of management of public lands were at issue. In Palila v. Hawaii,
the State managed non-indigenous wild sheep and goats on a state-
owned preserve, and, as a result, the animals consumed much of a key
food supply for an endangered species. The Ninth Circuit held this to be
1. J.B. Ruh], State and Local Government Vicarious Liability Under the ESA, 16 NAT.
REsoURCES & ENV'T 70, 70 (2001). The term vicarious liability is used both in civil tort and
in criminal law; in this context, however, it is better understood as devolving from the
criminal law. As LaFave's treatise notes, vicarious liability is most often imposed in the
criminal realm on those who have not injured anyone directly for the purpose of imposing
strict standards of performance on activities that, if improperly conducted, pose a danger to
the public. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.9 (3d ed. 2000). The Supreme Court has
never passed directly on the constitutional limits of such liability. Id. § 3.9(c).
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a "taking" of that endangered species. 2 Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Yeutter,
the Fifth Circuit found that the Forest Service's decision to allow
harvesting of entire sections of national forest lands had the effect of
harming an endangered species of woodpecker. The decision held that
the Forest Service both "took" the woodpecker and violated its duties to
consult with other federal agencies and to conserve endangered species.
3
The next major circuit court step toward vicarious liability came
in Defenders of Wildlife v. Environmental Protection Agency, where the
Eighth Circuit held that the agency's decision to continue to register the
pesticide strychnine (therefore making its use legal) caused harm to
endangered species and thus constituted a taking of those endangered
species. 4 This case was the first circuit court case to make the jump from
liability for governmental actions taken as the owner and manager of
public property to liability for third-party actions (in this case, the
decision by farmers and others to use the pesticide). Because the agency
was found liable simply for making something legal, Defenders of Wildlife
became the key precedent for later cases finding vicarious liability.
The first hint that Defenders of Wildlife would be extended to
cover state and local governmental regulatory programs came in Ramsey
v. Kantor, a Ninth Circuit opinion withholding summary judgment on a
claim arguing that states that regulated fishing could be liable for takes
of endangered species unless such state regulations were in compliance
with a federal permit allowing such takes. 5 Within the next two years,
both the First and the Eleventh Circuits would find that state or local
governments had taken species via regulatory regimes designed, at least
in part, to protect endangered species.
The first of these two cases, Strahan v. Coxe, held that
Massachusetts' regulation of its fishing industry constituted a take of
endangered whales because it permitted the use of gillnets and lobster
pots.6 No users of nets or pots were charged as co-defendants for their
2. Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 639 F.2d 495, 498 (1981) (Palila I). The
reasoning of Paila I, most particularly on the issue of causation, was specifically rejected by
Justice O'Connor in a 1995 concurring opinion. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys.
for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 713-14 (1995). However, the majority of the Court, in
describing the Sweet Home circuit decision as a direct conflict with Palila I, overruled the
lower court decision in Sweet Home, thus indicating that Palila I is good law. Id. at 695.
3. 926 F.2d 429 (1991). Deforestation of breeding habitat by a private corporation
would likewise be a taking under the Act. Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d
1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002). However, the ability to bring cases similar to Yeutter today is called
into question by the Fifth Circuit's focus on the economic interests of parties as providing
standing in Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202 (1994).
4. 882 F.2d 1294 (1989).
5. 96 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 1996).
6. 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997).
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actions that, under this reasoning, were violations of the Act. 7 The court
ordered the State to study ways to change its regulations to offer the
protection to the whales that the ESA indicated was proper.8
The second case, Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia
County, held that a Florida county that promulgated beach lighting
regulations could be liable for takes resulting when artificial light
harmed endangered sea turtles.9 Although the County's regulation had
been enacted partly to protect beach turtles, the Eleventh Circuit found
the County could still be liable for their failure to prohibit activities that
might harass sea turtles.10 Both Strahan and Loggerhead Turtle are
analyzed extensively throughout this article.
ISSUES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: WAS VICARIOUS
LIABILITY INTENDED?
The first section of the ESA explicitly states that the Act is based
on two "polic[ies] of Congress": one that applies to the federal
government and one that applies to state and local governments. For the
federal government, the Act states that "all Federal departments and
agencies shall seek to conserve endangered species... and shall utilize
their authorities in furtherance of the purposes of [the Act]." The second
policy is also issued in the form of a declaration to federal agencies,
requiring them to "cooperate with State and local agencies to resolve
water resource issues in concert with conservation of endangered
species."" In other words, by its own language, the Act was intended to
establish a duty for federal agencies to act affirmatively to preserve
species and to require those federal agencies to cooperate with state and
local governments.12
These dual purposes, the creation of an affirmative duty of
action on the part of the federal government to preserve species and the
establishment of a cooperative relationship with the states, are reflected
throughout the Act. The first purpose of the Act is reflected in provisions
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 148 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1081 (1999).
10. Id.
11. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c) (2000). "'Conserve'.. .mean[s] to use.. .all methods and proce-
dures which are necessary to bring any.. species.. .to the point at which the measures
provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary." Id. § 1532(3).
12. The interpretation of the statute that creates an affirmative duty for the federal
agencies to take affirmative action to assist species (as opposed to a requirement to merely
refrain from harm) also has support in the legislative history of the ESA. For instance, the
House Committee Report noted that the Park Service might be required to feed grizzly
bears in order to fulfill its duties under § 1536. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-412, at 14 (1973).
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laying out new responsibilities or powers for the federal agencies
charged with implementing the Act. Secretaries of those agencies were
given the mandatory duty to issue protective regulations to protect
threatened species13 and to make prompt regulations to prevent a
significant risk to endangered species.' 4 They were also given the power
to issue emergency regulations with immediate binding effect to protect
species. 15 Courts have generally found a strong basis for the affirmative
nature of the commands to the federal agencies. For example, one court
examining the provisions of the Act titled "federal agency actions and
consultations" 16 said that the provisions' "affirmative nature... is beyond
dispute."17
The second purpose of the Act, to promote cooperation between
federal and state governments, is also reflected in the Act's structure.
While the Act regulates the acts of state and local governments, it does so
only to the extent that it regulates other entities, notably the federal
government. 18 Moreover, cooperation is stressed in those provisions that
set standards for government-to-government relationships in carrying
out the Act. The regulation of state and local governments mirrors that of
the federal government in at least three provisions: allowing citizen suits
against governmental entities; 19  requiring adherence to federal
regulations;20 and defining a "person" such that a federal, state, or local
government can be found in violation of the Act's prohibitions (e.g., the
prohibition against taking endangered species). 21 The Act directs the
federal government to "cooperate to the maximum extent practicable"
with state governments2 and explicitly allows states to impose more
stringent protections than the federal regulations do.23 The Act also
13. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d) (2000).
14. Id. § 1533(b)(2)(C)(iii).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 1533(b)(7).
17. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Park Serv., 669 F.3d 384 (D. Wyo. 1987). However, in a
caution against using phrases like "beyond dispute," other courts have held that this
section does not require federal agencies to take affirmative steps to aid species. See, e.g.,
Leatherback Sea Turtle v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 99-00152 DAE, 1999 WL
33594329, at *13 (D. Haw. Oct. 18, 1999).
18. On the Act's face, the regulation is often identical for private parties. Shannon
Petersen, Endangered Species in the Urban Jungle: How the ESA Will Reshape American Cities, 19
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 423, 440 (2000).
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2000).
20. Id. § 1535(f).
21. Id. §§ 1532(13), 1538.
22. Id. § 1535(a).
23. Id. § 1535(f).
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provides that enforcement authority can be shared with states "by
agreement, with or without reimbursement." 24
It is against this statutory background that vicarious liability
cases, notably Strahan v. Coxe and Loggerhead Turtle, must be viewed. In
these cases, the courts appear to graft the federal government's
affirmative duty to act to protect endangered species onto state and local
governments that choose to regulate in areas that might affect
endangered species. In Strahan, the injunction upheld by the First Circuit
required the State to convene a working group in order to consider
changes that could be made to state regulations of commercial fishing
and submit to the court a proposal "to restrict, modify, or eliminate the
use of fixed-fishing gear." In Loggerhead Turtle, the Eleventh Circuit cited
the relief granted in Strahan as an example of the obligations that could
be imposed upon states and local governments. 25
In upholding a requirement that states regulate to protect
endangered species, these cases appear to ignore the statutory structure
that gave differing duties and powers to the federal and state
governments. In finding parallel federal, state, and local government
obligations to act affirmatively, courts have relied on the fact that the
authority granted to prevent takes is found in section 9 of the Act (§
1538), which regulates federal and state governments as well as private
parties, and not in section 7, which admittedly applies to the federal
government alone. Specifically, in Loggerhead Turtle, the Eleventh Circuit
held that, since Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA and similar cases had relied
on the anti-take provisions of the statute found in § 1538 (Section 9 of the
Act) and not on federal duties documented elsewhere in the Act in
finding that the government had illegally taken a species, the local
government's failure to impose regulations that protected the turtle
could subject it to vicarious liability. 26 Similarly, because § 1538 makes
24. Id. § 1540(e).
25. At least one district court has also relied on Strahan to impose even more serious
obligations on local governments. In United States v. Town of Plymouth, 6 F. Supp. 2d 81, 92-
93 (D. Mass. 1998), the injunction imposed by the court stated that "[tihe Town shall
continue to protect the piping plover nesting habitat" and "shall close [the beach]."
26. Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 148 F.3d 1231, 1251-52
(11th Cir. 1998). The decision's use of section 9 instead of section 7-based reasoning has
been cited as a probable mistake by at least one commentator. Ruhl, supra note 1, at 71-72.
Although Defenders of Wildlife applied provisions in section 9 that extend to all public and
private entities and prohibit a take, there is little support in the language of section 9 to
indicate that Congress intended the duties of action to be equally broadly applicable.
Finally, since the Supreme Court has found that, unless a "clear statement" to the contrary
is made, statutes should not be read as "subject[ing] the States to liability to which they had
not been subject before," courts that read into section 9 the ability to impose liability on the
States for regulations in areas that have always been within their police power are running
[Vol. 45
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takings of endangered species equally illegal for federal and state
governments, the First Circuit in Strahan v. Coxe rejected the claim that
vicarious liability could only be imposed on the federal government
under § 1536.27 The Strahan court did not address the argument that the
statutory text in § 1538 (unlike other provisions in the Act) does not
appear to require affirmative use of the governmental power to conserve
species.
Finally, decisions by courts to impose a requirement that state
and local governments pass more stringent regulations to protect
endangered species contradict two other provisions of the Act. Section
1535(f) explicitly states that state statutes that permit what is prohibited
by the Act are "void." There is absolutely no discussion of ordering
alteration to such statutes or creating requirements that states pass
statutes that do conform with the Act. This provision shows that
Congress considered the problem of more lenient state regulatory
regimes and selected the remedy of voiding them (as opposed to
requiring states to reform them). Therefore, by fashioning a method of
repair for the statute instead of merely striking it, the courts run afoul of
the statute's explicit direction in these situations. Second, 16 U.S.C. §
1535(c) gives states an option to attempt to meet federal standards and
share enforcement under the Act through "cooperative agreements."
However, as recently as 2000, no state had taken the federal government
up on such an offer. 28 Thus, state and local governments legally lack
authority to share enforcement duties with the federal government
under the ESA framework.
ISSUES OF INTERPRETATION: REGULATORY DEFINITIONS
AND ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE
Another possible source of authority for imposing vicarious
liability might be the regulatory interpretations of the Act by those
Secretaries designated by Congress to enforce the Act. Such support,
however, is minimal at best. An interpretation of the Act that would not
reach the County's regulation (or lack thereof) at issue in Loggerhead
Turtle was put forward by the agency in charge of implementing the Act
on land, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). The Act's
implementing regulations lend themselves most naturally to a finding
that acts classified as a take do not include inadequate state and local
afoul of this rule of statutory construction as well. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 64-65 (1989).
27. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d. 155, 168 n.4 (1st Cir. 1997).
28. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002).
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government regulation of third parties. Moreover, the informal guidance
developed by the agency also supports this point of view. In other
words, findings of vicarious liability for inadequate regulation by state
and local governments not only fly in the face of the Act's design; they
also contradict agency interpretations of that statute. For instance, in
order to reach its decision in Loggerhead Turtle, the Eleventh Circuit
ignored key descriptive language in the regulation at issue and then
used that interpretation to disregard the guidance issued by USFWS that
did not support vicarious liability.
In the Act, "take" is defined to encompass many forms of
conduct, including actions that "harm" and "harass" endangered
species. The interpretative regulations define "harm" as follows: "an act
which actually kills or injures wildlife. Such acts may include significant
habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns,
including breeding, feeding or sheltering." 29 This definition was upheld
as valid by Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon.30 The definition of "harm" therefore clearly applies to activities
that have an immediate on-the-ground impact. On its face, the regulation
does not appear to reach regulatory modifications (or lack thereof) that
have the effect of making such habitat modification legal under state or
local law. To make the inference that the regulation does reach
regulatory modifications despite the fact that no language explicitly does
so leads to absurd results. For instance, if having a land use regulation
that insufficiently protects endangered species classifies as "harm," then
states are "harming" the species illegally even if absolutely no change to
the habitat results. In other words, even if no citizen of the state ever
makes the habitat modification that the state regulation "allows" him to,
29. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002).
30. 515 U.S. 687 (1995). Sweet Home engendered a debate between Justice O'Connor
(concurring) and Justice Scalia (dissenting) about whether habitat modifications that can
affect a population but are not currently affecting individual animals (by destroying likely
future habitat, for instance) were proximate enough to be legally understood as possessing
sufficient causation. O'Connor argued in the affirmative, Scalia in the negative. For a
discussion of the O'Connor/Scalia disagreement, see Duane J. Desiderio, Sweet Home on
the Range: A Model for As-Applied Challenges to the "Harm" Regulation, 3 ENvTL. L. 725, 732-40
(1997). The majority opinion noted that the statute imposed "ordinary requirements of
proximate causation," as well as the "but for" standard of legal causation, as a requirement
for finding a "take." Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700 n.13. No member of the Court addressed
the thornier causation question of whether the promulgation of regulations that fail to
prohibit acts that may qualify as takes would be the "cause" of takes that did (or did not)
occur.
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and therefore no animal is ever killed or injured as a result, the State is
still liable for violating the Act. 31
A similar problem is apparent in the Eleventh Circuit's
interpretation of the definition of "harass" in Loggerhead Turtle, which
interpreted the definition extremely broadly to include enacting
regulatory regimes. The regulatory definition of "harass" is as follows:
"an intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood
of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to significantly
disrupt normal behavioral patterns which include, but are not limited to,
breeding, feeding, or sheltering." 32 Like the definition of "harm," the
definition of "harass" applies to actions that have an immediate on-the-
ground effect. However, the inclusion of "omission[s]" as a basis for
regulatory violations could be helpful for claims involving vicarious
liability, since such claims may rest on the failure of the governmental
body to regulate stringently enough (or at all). However, as discussed
below, the structure of the definition indicates that it should not be
applied solely to regulatory acts or omissions.
The sentence essentially breaks down into two parts: the
definition of the acts or omissions that qualify, and the explanatory
prepositional phrase that modifies this subject. In other words, the
subjects of the sentence, "act" and "omission," are modified by the
restrictive clause beginning with "which"; this clause further defines
subjects as actions or omissions creating a likelihood of injury to wildlife.
The explanatory prepositional phrase "by annoying it..." is therefore
structurally intended to inform how the likelihood of injury is created. A
different presentation of the same sentence (with numbers added for
clarification) illustrates the grammatical structure more clearly: "an
intentional or negligent act or omission which (1) creates the likelihood
of injury to wildlife by annoying it (2) to such an extent as to significantly
disrupt (3) normal behavioral patterns which include, but are not limited
to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering." The understanding of the
grammatical structure is especially important in Loggerhead Turtle
because of the light it sheds on the proper understanding of the role of
the word "likelihood": the increased "likelihood" is not an increased
likelihood of an intentional or negligent action occurring; it is the action's
31. The Ninth Circuit has found that habitat modification does not constitute harm
unless it actually kills or injures wildlife. Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal, 204 F.3d 920, 924-
28 (2000); accord Ariz. Cattle Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 273 F.3d 1229,
1238 (9th Cir. 2001). If an alteration to habitat that could but does not harm the species is
not a violation of the Endangered Species Act, a regulation that may contribute to a
decision by an individual to make a habitat modification that could or could not cause
injury to wildlife should not be a violation of the ESA.
32. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2002).
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likelihood of injuring the wildlife by annoying it. Therefore, unless a
regulation, by itself, is capable of "annoying" an animal, a regulation
cannot create the likelihood of injury and is therefore not a prohibited
"omission" or "act."
Properly understood therefore, Volusia County would be
"harassing" turtles by annoying them and therefore increasing their
chance of injury by turning on publicly owned beach lighting, or for
failing to turn it off. However, in order to find that Volusia County has
"harassed" a turtle by failing to force an individual to turn off a private
light, the same inference of the definition of "harm" would have to be
made: the "omission" of a regulation prohibiting turning on a private
light would have to be seen as "harassing" the turtles, even if the private
individual never flicked the switch and therefore no likelihood of injury
to the turtle was ever created.
Thus, in order to find that regulations, by their simple existence,
could "harass," the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the regulatory definition
of harass to include actions or omissions that make it more likely that
third parties will commit harassing acts. In essence, the Eleventh Circuit
interpreted the regulation to mean that a government can hurt turtles
even if no individual ends up doing something on the ground that
actually increases any turtle's chance of injury. 33 This flies in the face of
the purpose of the regulation, which indicates that the increased
likelihood of injury is only created by actually annoying the turtles.
Although the members of the groups that funded the litigation might be
correctly characterized as being annoyed by the lack of regulation
protecting the turtles even if no lights were turned on, these individuals
are not members of an endangered species that the Act seeks to protect.
The plaintiff turtles themselves are unquestionably annoyed by lights,
not the inactivity of governmental bodies.
The awkward reading of the regulatory definition of "harass"
created a further problem that the Eleventh Circuit had to address: such
an interpretation clashes with guidance issued by the USFWS. 34 The
USFWS guidance states that what is being authorized in an incidental
take permit "is to authorize incidental take of threatened or endangered
species, not to authorize the underlying activities that result in [the]
33. As noted previously, given that the statute provides that state and local laws that
offer less protection to species than the Act does are void, the Eleventh Circuit's reading of
this regulation is also less compatible with the statute than the alternative presented here.
34. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., DEP'T OF
THE INTERIOR & DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING HANDBOOK
(1996), available at http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/hcpbook.htm (last visited Feb. 26,
2005) [hereinafter HABITAT HANDBOOK].
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take." 35 This is consistent with the requirement that plaintiffs show an
actual taking of a species occurred in order to have an injury in fact;36
those individuals who engage in conduct that could cause a take, but
"get lucky" when no takes occur, are therefore non-prosecutable. The
Eleventh Circuit rejected this guidance because it conflicted with the
court's erroneous reading of the regulatory language, and since guidance
is informal and non-binding authority, binding regulations may trump
it. However, it is quite possible-and correct-to read the regulatory
language to say exactly what the guidance indicates. Reading the
regulation in this way would mean that the agency is being internally
consistent; reading the two in opposition forced the court to assume that
the agency issued guidance explaining the regulation that contradicted
the regulation itself.
In spite of its rejection of USFWS guidance interpreting "harass"
to exclude issuing or failing to issue regulations, the court turned to the
guidance to support the proposition that lack of regulation was
potentially illegal when evaluating a second claim of the County. The
County claimed that because USFWS had issued a incidental take permit
conditioned on regulation of lighting, they already had federal
permission to issue lighting regulations without fear of liability. In
finding this defense inadequate, the court predicated its argument on a
distinction between "actions" and "activities." In support, the court
quoted the guidance document's provision asking applicants for
incidental take permits to describe "'all actions... that.. .are likely to result
in an incidental take' so that the permit holder 'can determine the
applicability of the incidental take authorization to the activities they
undertake.'" 37 Based on this and on its reading of statutory language, the
Eleventh Circuit therefore found a distinction between "actions" and
"activities." It held that "activities" are those things permittees seek
permits for and therefore can be exempted from liability by permit;
35. Id. at 1-1.
36. Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 148 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir.
1998); United States v. Town of Plymouth, 6 F. Supp. 2d 81, 90 (D. Mass. 1998); Michael J.
Bean, The Endangered Species Act and Private Land: Four Lessons Learned from the Past Quarter
Century, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,701, 10,702-06 (1998).
37. Loggerhead Turtle, 148 F.3d at 1243. The court's piecing together of these two
phrases into a single sentence does not reflect their actual placement in the document: the
first quoted segment is from a sentence on page 3-12 of the guidance; the second phrase
comes from a sentence that occurs two paragraphs later. The quote in this guidance that the
court rejected as contradictory to the regulation language (the phrase quoted in the
paragraph above) is the topic sentence of the intervening paragraph. HABITAT HANDBOOK,
supra note 34, at 3-12, 3-13.
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however, "actions" are mitigating measures and therefore are not
exempted from liability.
The language of the guidance provides little support for the
Eleventh Circuit's distinction between actions and activities. When the
guidance document refers to "actions" in the context of mitigation, they
are quite explicitly called "mitigation actions" 38 or "recovery actions" 39
or "corrective actions." 40 The guidance also uses the word "actions"
several times in a way that is distinct from the meaning the Eleventh
Circuit assigns to it (notably, federal "actions" as referred to in section 7
of the Act).41 Finally, many uses of the word "actions" in the document
clearly refer to things for which people are seeking permits. For example,
"The section 10 regulations require that an HCP [Habitat Conservation
Plan] specify the measures the applicant will take to "monitor" the
impacts of the taking resulting from project actions."42 The fact that the
guidance does not appear to distinguish "actions" from "activities" in
the manner the Eleventh Circuit suggests that it did calls its
interpretation of the federal guidance into question.
The language of the regulations does not, on its face, support the
proposition that the implementing agencies understood the ESA to
provide for vicarious liability. The language of the interpretative
guidance of those regulations clearly states that vicarious liability was
not considered covered by the Act. Finding that the guidance did allow
for vicarious liability required a reading of the guidance that can at best
be characterized as selective and at worst as disingenuous. Thus, the
statute, its implementing regulations, and the guidance interpreting
those regulations all fail to provide for vicarious liability. The reason that
the executive and legislative branches have not made provisions for
vicarious liability for state and local governments in the ESA may be the
high likelihood that the doctrine is unconstitutional, both because the
situation does not create standing and because of the risk of running
afoul of the commandeering jurisprudence.
38. HABITAT HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 3-19.
39. Id. at 3-23.
40. Id. at 3-25.
41. Id. at 3-15, 3-18.
42. Id. at 3-26. "The frequency, timing, and duration of the sampling regimen should
also relate to the type of action being evaluated, the species affected by the action, and the
response of the species to the effects produced by the action." Id. 50 CFR §§
17.22(b)(1)(iii)(B), 222.22(b)(5)(iii) (emphasis added).
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STANDING: INJURY IN FACT AND CAUSATION
One of the elements of standing stemming from the U.S.
Constitution's Article III case and controversy requirement is the "injury
in fact" requirement. 43 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme
Court stated that, when "a plaintiff's asserted injury arises from the
government's allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of
someone else, much more is needed" 44 to prove causation than simply
demonstrating that an injury exists. The plaintiff must instead show that,
in response to the government's decision, the regulated or regulatable
parties will act in such a way as to cause the injury.45 The vicarious
liability cases rightly assume that the third-party bad actors would be
bound by the government regulations at issue.46 They additionally
assume that, by the state or local government's issuance of a regulation
or a permit or by the failure to prohibit injurious action, individuals will
respond by proceeding with actions that cause an injury, hence
satisfying the Lujan requirement for injury in fact.47 Therefore, the
plaintiffs in vicarious liability cases argue that they meet the
requirements the Supreme Court set forth in Lujan for injury in fact when
challenging a government's regulation (or lack thereof). For instance, the
Fourth Circuit found that if the federal government issues a permit for
an activity that could not legally go forward "but for" such a permit, that
is sufficient to satisfy the causation requirement for an injury that would
result if the permitted activity goes forward.48
43. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
44. 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992).
45. Id. While some of the redressability concerns in Lujan did not command a majority
of the court, this statement, and the previous quote, are drawn from Part II, which did
garner five votes. In addition, four members of the Court found a lack of standing because
"it is entirely conjectural whether the nonagency activity that affects respondents [dam
construction] will be altered or affected by the agency activity they seek to achieve
[removal of 10% of total funding for the dam]." Id. at 571. A large share of the majority's
Lujan opinion focusing on whether the plaintiff had directly been injured would not be at
issue where the endangered species itself is the plaintiff, as in Loggerhead Turtle.
46. For instance, the State of Massachusetts was permitted by the federal government
to regulate the state's lobster fishing industry, Volusia County had authority from the state
to regulate lighting, and the Town of Plymouth had the authority from the state to regulate
the use of the beach and to punish offenders.
47. Moreover, on redressability issues, because the activities causing the harm are
conducted on U.S. property and not abroad as in Lujan, there is less doubt that the activities
that are proscribed would cause the injury to stop.
48. Pye v. United States, 269 F.3d 459, 471 (2001). This also is arguably a basis for a pre-
Lujan decision in the Eighth Circuit, Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 882 F.2d 1294, 1301-02
(8th Cir. 1989). At least one commentator has suggested that Lujan requires a showing of
proximate as well as "but for" causation. Desiderio, supra note 30, at 757. In Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 700 n.13 (1995), a majority of
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The argument has an Achilles' heel, however. In order to satisfy
the Lujan test of injury in fact, the government regulation must cause the
injuries. 49 While there is little doubt that a government decision on how
to manage government property (e.g., Palila50 ) does cause the injuries
produced under that management regime, it is less clear that, by issuing
a permit, the State is causing injury. In a restatement of the Lujan test, the
Supreme Court, in its unanimous decision in Bennett v. Spear, said that
the injury "must be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not the result of independent action of some third party
not before the court." 51 The Court noted that "injury produced by
determinative or coercive effect upon the action of someone else" was
not excluded from satisfying the causation injury, but it again stressed
that the third party actions cannot be independent, and, in this case, the
decision not to deliver the water was essentially coerced.5 2 Because
issuing a permit for an illegal activity may not cause a take if the third-
party permittee does not then independently choose to engage in the
activity, and because the individual is not coerced into performing the
action through a government permit, it is not clear that sufficient
causation would be present to address the Supreme Court's standards. 53
the court specifically mentioned both "but for" and proximate causation and found both
were required by the take language in the ESA.
49. Cf. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002) (finding the government's decision to withhold permits for construction during a
moratorium period sufficiently caused the injury in fact to the plaintiffs who were not able
to build on their land).
50. Palila v. Haw. Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 639 F. 2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981). This
differs from the injury in fact in Federal Election Commission v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998),
because in Akins the injury in fact stemmed directly from the lack of information the
government was required to release. Here, the government's action causes no injury unless
a third party acts as well.
51. 520 U.S. 154, 167 (1997). In the case, the court found that a decision by the govern-
ment to meet a certain lake level would cause the government not to deliver water at
previously expected levels and therefore sufficiently cause the injuries of water users
dependent on that supply.
52. Id. at 169.
53. Citing long lists of judicial precedent on the issue, the Tenth Circuit ruled in 1987
that failure to regulate on the government's part does not satisfy the proximate cause
requirement. Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987). The decision in this case
is difficult to reconcile with the holding of the Fourth Circuit in Pye, 269 F.3d at 471,
creating an apparent circuit split on this issue. See also supra note 48; Hobbs v. Sprague, 87
F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (holding that plaintiffs' injuries from timber
harvesting were not traceable to a lack of consultation and review by USFWS); Fla.
Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that standing required
that "the challenged acts of the defendant, not of some absent third party, will cause the
particularized injury of the plaintiff"). For a commentator's argument that private suits
"against states alleged not to be performing their duties as regulators" violate the Tenth
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The finding that permitting an activity makes the government
liable for damages caused by that activity has wide-ranging impact,
especially in the environmental context. This impact is illustrated by the
opinion of a district court case in California. In finding that a
government decision permitting mining to occur is "too remote from the
generation of the [waste] to find that the United States' conduct was a
'cause' of the releases," the court noted that the opposite finding would
make the United States legally liable for nearly every major cleanup in
the country. 54
Two federal circuit court's responses to the causation issue in the
vicarious liability context are discussed below. The First Circuit in
Strahan v. Coxe found that proximate cause was present where the state
issued permits that explicitly allowed only conduct that the court found
was illegal, and it was foreseeable that the permit holders would act in
precisely the illegal ways specified. 55 The Eleventh Circuit, in Loggerhead
Turtle, reserved the statutory causation question but found that local
government regulations were the cause of the injury in fact (in essence
ruling that federal inaction was not a cause) based on a theory of
exclusive control or primary control over the activities in question.56
Each of these approaches to the causation question is critiqued below.
Section A: Statutory Causation Requirements
Causation is necessary for standing not just for constitutional
reasons, but because of the statutory basis of vicarious liability. The
statutory argument for vicarious liability rests on the Act's provision
making it unlawful to "attempt to commit [a take], solicit another to
commit [a take], or cause [a take] to be committed." 57 Government
regulation (or the lack thereof) would fall only under the third
prohibition in this list.58 In order for a county's regulation to be illegal
and Eleventh Amendments, see Alfred R. Light, He Who Pays the Piper Should Call the Tune:
Dual Sovereignty in U.S. Environmental Law, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 779, 823 (1998).
54. United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 1263, 1274-75 (E.D. Cal.
1997). Considering that the costs of cleaning up one Superfund site contaminated with
mining waste is estimated at well over a billion dollars, that liability is not insubstantial.
Paul Koberstein, Idaho's Sore Thumb (Pt. 7), CASCADIA TIMES, Spring 2002, available at
http://cascadia.times.org/archives/2002/thumb7.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
55. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F. 3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997).
56. Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 148 F.3d 1231, 1247, 1249
(11th Cir. 1998).
57. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(g) (2000).
58. Government action could not fall under either of the first two provisions. The ESA
provisions are correctly understood in the context of their common law meanings. Strahan,
127 F.3d at 163. The Act's separation of "attempt" and "solicitation," which reflects a
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under the Act, the government action (in the form of insufficiently
protective regulations) must "cause" a take. The statutory regime thus
imposes its own causation requirement through the language of the
statute. In Sweet Home, the Supreme Court found this language imported
principles of proximate causation while noting that the statute also
required "but for" causation in order to determine a take existed.5 9 Since
Sweet Home, only one case in the circuit courts has explicitly interpreted
the "cause to be committed" statutory language in application to
vicarious liability: Strahan v. Coxe.60
In Strahan, the First Circuit found sufficient causation by
distinguishing state laws that permitted only activities that violated
federal law from state laws that permitted activities that might be
conducted either legally or illegally. 61 The First Circuit ruled that
because the Massachusetts regulations and executory permits explicitly
authorized the use of a gillnet, and because it was impossible to use a
gillnet without conflicting with the ESA, the state was causing the
violation to be committed. 62 It distinguished this from licensure of cars,
debate about the potential overlap/inclusiveness of these two terms, further indicates that
the Act is meant to be understood in terms of the common law. See LAFAVE, supra note 1, §
6.1(f). A government regulation clearly would not meet common law definitions of attempt
or solicitation. Attempt is "an intent to do an act or to bring about certain consequences
which would in law amount to a crime; and an act in furtherance of that intent which, as it
is most commonly put, goes beyond mere preparation." Id. § 6.2. It is ludicrous to assert
that any government has an intent to encourage its citizens to commit crimes, or that a
failure to regulate constitutes as an act of intent. Solicitation occurs when an actor, with
intent that another person commit a crime, entices, advises, incites, orders, or otherwise
encourages that person to commit a crime. Id. § 6.1. Again, it is nonsensical to view the
absence of regulation or insufficient regulation as an affirmative enticement or incitement
to crime.
59. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 700 n.13
(1995); see also supra note 30.
60. The Eleventh Circuit, in Loggerhead Turtle, explicitly reserved the statutory
causation question. 148 F.3d at 1252 n.24. The only district court not bound by the Strahan
decision to consider the provision explicitly was the Middle District of Florida in Loggerhead
Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1307 (M.D. Fla. 2000)
(Loggerhead Turtle III), and that court found insufficient causation.
61. Strahan, 127 F.3d at 164. Permitting programs are among the state programs seen as
most acceptable to be challenged as a "take," though general regulations may also be
challenged. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Kantor, 96 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 1996) (implying that
regulations not contemplated by an incidental take permit might violate the ESA).
Activities that are not a form of legal license may not be challengeable. Envtl. Prot. Info.
Ctr. v. Tuttle, No. C 00-0713 SC, 2001 WL 114422, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n
v. Nat'l Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 3d 384, 389-90 (D. Wyo. 1987).
62. Strahan, 127 F.3d at 163-64. The court found that the use of gillnets violated the Act
despite the fact that a federal agency, the National Marine Fisheries Service, had expressly
declined to prohibit their use under their Environmental Protection Agency authority. Id. at
164.
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which could then be used in either an illegal or legal manner by the
license holders. 63
Making a distinction between these types of permits produces
inconsistencies in light of the fact that having a state permit to engage in
an activity is not considered a defense to a violation of other laws.64 For
instance, having a Clean Water Act permit allowing discharge of certain
pollutants does not necessarily protect against liability for harm to an
endangered species caused by that discharge.65 Moreover, without
explicit statutory language to the contrary, an erroneously issued permit
cannot change the obligations or rights of the permittee, because
administrative mistakes do not create rights that would not exist had the
mistake not been made. 66 Therefore, there is absolutely no bar to federal
prosecution of the third party created by the permit. Under the logic
used by Strahan v. Coxe to make governments liable, a state can become
liable for issuing a permit even though that permit has no legal effect
whatsoever.
The logic used in Strahan v. Coxe may also indicate a circuit split
on the issue of whether governments can be held liable for issuing
permits. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have either dismissed claims that
63. Id. at 163-64. The First Circuit later returned to this distinction in an unpublished
opinion to find the U.S. Coast Guard (U.S.C.G.) not liable for violations of the ESA by the
vessels it regulates through permitting, because the permits issued by the U.S.C.G. were
more analogous to car licensure. Strahan v. Linnon, 187 F.3d 623 (1st Cir. 1998).
64. See, e.g., City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1309-10 (N.D.
Okla. 2003) (having a valid Clean Water Act permit was not an adequate defense to other
injuries protected by the common law), vacated pursuant to settlement (July 16, 2003).
Similarly, the existence of a permit to use a particular pesticide, and use in line with that
permit, was not considered adequate to defend from liability when the use resulted in
water pollution. Altman v. Town of Amherst, N.Y., Docket No. 01-7468, 2002 WL 31132139
(2d Cir. Sept. 26, 2002); League of Wilderness Defenders/Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v.
Forsgren, 309 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2002).
65. Elizabeth Rosan, EPA's Approach to Endangered Species Protection in State Clean Water
Act Programs, 30 ENVTL. L. 447, 461 (2000). A contrary holding would conflict with the
Supremacy Clause, as it would allow a state to override federal law. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2. Thus, permits cannot and have not provided a defense to violators of federal statutes
absent an explicit provision providing such a defense in federal law, despite what
advocates of vicarious liability have argued. See, e.g., Sean W. Kerwin, Note, Loggerhead
Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, Florida: Implied Permitting as a Justiciable Cause
of Action, 6 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 205, 220 (2001). In addition, a commentator's suggestion
that the two provisions in the ESA regarding the supremacy of the Act over state law are in
potential conflict has not appeared to trouble courts, which have consistently found in
favor of federal law whether or not a cooperative agreement with the state government is
in place. See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F. 3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997); Swan View Coalition, Inc. v.
Turner, 824 F. Supp. 923 (D. Mont. 1992); Jean 0. Melious, Enforcing the Endangered Species
Act Against the States, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 605, 630-31 (2001).
66. Fed. Crop Ins. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond,
496 U.S. 414 (1990).
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permits were granted without proper consideration of endangered
species or held that states do not have to consider the ESA when issuing
permits. 67 It is inconsistent to find that states cannot be required to
submit permits for consultation on endangered species and at the same
time hold states liable if and when those permits do not fully comport
with the requirements of the Act. The only way to reconcile the two
holdings would be to determine that, while states cannot be required to
ask what requirements the Act places on their activities, they will be
found guilty of takes if they guess wrong. Since such a finding would be
little more than a back door requirement that states engage in
consultation under 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (section 7 of the Act) - despite
statutory language limiting those duties to federal agencies. Such a
finding is irreconcilable with the statute.
Section B: Exclusivity of Regulatory Power or Primary Authority to
Regulate
What is notable about the vicarious liability cases is not just that
they rely on government regulation "causing" the injury in fact, but that,
where state and local regulations are insufficient to protect species, the
responsibility for any under-protection of the species is not placed on the
federal government but is instead assigned to the state and local
governments. Loggerhead Turtle provides a circuit court argument about
why causation, and hence liability, is correctly assigned to the local
government. The opinion finds such liability at the local level due to
"exclusivity" of regulatory power or "primary authority" to regulate.
However, as discussed below, neither of these possible reasons can
support finding liability for non-action at the local level.
In Loggerhead, the Eleventh Circuit found that Volusia County
"indisputably" had exclusive power to regulate beachfront lighting.68
This statement is indisputably false. Both the state and federal
governments have the option of exercising regulatory power over the
beachfront that the County regulated. While the court's failure to
67. Am. Forest & Paper Ass'n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 1998) (Am. Forest ); Am.
Forest & Paper Ass'n v. EPA, 154 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 1998) (Am. Forest II). In the Fifth
Circuit case, the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) requirement that Louisiana
submit its Clean Water Act permits to the EPA so that the federal agency could engage in
endangered species consultation was held to be an overreaching of EPA's authority. Am.
Forest 1, 137 F.3d at 298. The Tenth Circuit dismissed a case with a similar requirement on
standing grounds. Am. Forest II, 154 F.3d at 1158. For a discussion of both cases, see
Melious, supra note 65, at 612-14.
68. Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 148 F.3d 1231, 1247 (11th
Cir. 1998).
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recognize the State's power to regulate the beach can be explained away
by reliance on the State's explicit delegation of control to local
governments, its failure to recognize federal power has no such
explanation. The failure to recognize the non-exclusive nature of the
County's power creates a mistake of law that bears significantly on the
Eleventh Circuit finding of standing.
This problem in the doctrine of vicarious liability is being used
by federal agencies to suggest that counties have a responsibility to
break with state government on an issue the state has already
considered. In California, a county commission's potential approval of a
subdivision drew warnings from a federal agency that the county would
face liability for the take of endangered fish and frogs that would result
from the increase in use of water in a nearby stream.69 This followed a
decision by California's Water Resources Control Board, which had
considered and rejected a petition to disallow the water usage on the
basis that it would harm endangered species in the creek. 70 The threats of
litigation existed despite the fact that, in California, local legislation in
conflict with state legislation is void, and conflict exists when a local
ordinance "duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied" by
the state. 71 The vicarious liability jurisprudence places the county in a
difficult position: face litigation for their approval of an action already
approved by the state on vicarious liability grounds or face litigation to
have their decision struck for contradiction on state law grounds.
The federal government's power to regulate interstate commerce
is not governed by provisions in state constitutions or local charters. The
Eleventh Circuit's mistake regarding the power of the state in this matter
is highlighted when it states that the Volusia County charter "grants" the
authority to pass such regulations.72 Unlike states, which are
independent sovereigns deriving their powers directly from their people,
counties are creatures of the state and their power is gained through a
devolution from the state.73 Therefore, because the State of Florida could
69. Jessica Lyons, County v. Endangered Species, MONTEREY COUNTY WEEKLY, Sept. 16,
2004, available at http://www.montereycountyweekly.com/issues/Issue.09-16-2004/news
/Article.newsl.
70. Protest by the Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance, In re Water Rights App. No.
A029282, Pet. T030980 (Cal. Water Res. Control Bd. 1999), available at http://users.rcn.
com/ccate/SWRCBLasGarzasDec99.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
71. See, e.g., Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara, 872 P.2d 143,156 (Cal. 1994).
72. Loggerhead Turtle, 148 F. 3d at 1249.
73. Local governmental units have police power only to the extent of authorization
from the state, which holds the police power as an aspect of sovereignty. There is no
independent basis for sovereignty for local governmental units or other subdivisions of the
state. LAFAVE, supra note 1, § 1.7; Municipal Corporations and Other Subdivisions, 56 AM. JUR.
2D § 391 (2004). Thus, although Florida's counties do have limited sovereignty under the
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override Volusia County's decisions, the county's power is not
exclusive.74 The county charter could not create "exclusive" control; only
continued acquiescence by the State could do that. In Loggerhead Turtle,
the State of Florida demonstrated acquiescence (and active interest in the
way the delegated power was used) by promulgating guidelines on the
protection of the turtles in 1993 and encouraging counties to adopt these
guidelines. 75
It is possible to explain the Eleventh Circuit's assumption that no
state power existed to issue regulations in a way that eliminates the
error. When the Eleventh Circuit relied on the exclusivity of enforcement
powers to find standing on claims alleging inadequate enforcement, 76 it
found that the county had no enforcement power in certain areas
because it had delegated that power to the municipalities. In other
words, the Eleventh Circuit did not find the ability to revoke powers as
retaining a measure of control. 77 To be consistent, the court could find
that states had no power over these beaches, implying that the state has
given and not revoked the power to regulate. Therefore, the court's
argument that the state has no power over these beaches can be
interpreted to avoid the error.
The Eleventh Circuit's disregard of the federal power to
regulate, however, cannot be reconciled by assuming a delegation
occurred. As long as the regulations and enforcement desired by the
plaintiffs were needed to protect the endangered loggerhead turtles (an
assertion necessary to the plaintiffs' case in Loggerhead Turtle), the ESA
Florida constitution, that sovereignty is subordinate to and derives from the state's powers.
City of Tampa v. Easton, 198 So. 753, 754 (Fla. 1941).
74. It is important to note that the same would not be unquestionably true of a federal
revocation of state power because of the presence of the Tenth Amendment and an
assumption that the federal government is one of limited powers. United States v. Oregon,
366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
75. Katherine R. Butler, Coastal Protection of Sea Turtles in Florida, 13 J. LAND USE &
ENvTL. L. 399, 423-24 (1998).
76. Loggerhead Turtle, 148 F.3d at 1250.
77. Constructing the Eleventh Circuit opinion to hold that delegation of power is
sufficient to escape liability even when a revocation is possible could draw support from
related precedents. There is support for the proposition that a delegation of powers strips
the grantor of its power to act in the area, at least when the power is exercised by the
grantee, even when revocation of the power is possible. Harmon Industries v. Browner, 191
F.3d 894, 898-99 (8th Cir. 1999). This precedent may not be strong in this situation,
however, since, under the regime in Harmon, the federal government explicitly retained
power and the duty to reject insufficient regulations and to act when the state did not, and
therefore cannot escape liability via its delegation. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Ctr, Inc. v. EPA, 344
F.3d 832, 845 n.18 (9th Cir. 2003); Mo. Soybean Ass'n v. Mo. Clean Water Comm'n, 102
S.W.3d 10, 28-29 (Mo. 2003) (finding that a challenge to State action that required EPA
approval was not ripe if no decision had been made by the EPA).
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grants the federal government the power to make the same regulations
for the beach. 78 No formal revocation of County power would be needed
for such an exercise (as it would be for the State in this case); the
Supremacy Clause simply would override any conflicting regulation by
a state, county, or municipal government. (Indeed, if the Act did not give
the federal government such regulatory power, the ability of a federal
court to order any relief would be dubious, since Congress might not
have delegated such a power at all.79) It is, in fact, "indisputable" that the
federal government's ability to regulate in the area destroys any
exclusiveness of power the county might otherwise possess.
Section C: Primary Authority to Regulate
The Eleventh Circuit's erroneous assumption of Volusia
County's exclusive power resulted in the court's finding that the County
also had exclusive liability. The importance the Eleventh Circuit places
on exclusive power is particularly apparent when it distinguishes
municipalities. When municipalities were delegated exclusive power to
enforce regulations by Volusia County, there was found to be no
standing in a suit against the County for those actions. 80 However, when
municipalities shared enforcement authority with the county (e.g., when
the municipality could regulate, but Volusia County also could do so),
the court found there was standing in the suit against the County. 81
Thus, from the municipalities' point of view, with exclusive power
comes exclusive liability.
However, even shared power may not exempt counties from
some share of the liability under the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning. Where
counties were found to share regulatory authority, the court still found
there to be standing to sue the counties.82 Whether the Eleventh Circuit
assumed the county bore full liability as the "primary" regulator8 3 or
78. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(iii) (2000); Bean, supra note 36, at 10,704. The ability to
regulate species and actions that are typically local under the aegis of the ESA has been
found by several circuits to be a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause power, even given
current Supreme Court jurisprudence defining limits to the Commerce Clause power. GDF
Realty Invs., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 624 (5th Cir. 2003); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton,
323 F.3d 1062, 1068-70 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 492-98 (4th Cir.
2000).
79. See infra note 90 and accompanying text regarding the commandeering and
redressability issues.
80. Loggerhead Turtle, 148 F.3d at 1250 (discussing Ormond Beach and New Smyrna
Beach).
81. Id. (discussing Daytona Beach and Daytona Beach Shores).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1249.
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whether the court envisioned a regime of joint and several liability with
the municipal authority is not altogether clear. The court did not require
that the municipalities with shared regulatory power be joined as
indispensable parties, and the county did not later assert claims against
the municipalities. 84 The court also noted that Volusia County had the
"authority-and arguably a duty" to pass regulations that protect the
environment.8 5 Without citing any authority from the record, the court
stated that "Volusia County obviously contemplated that [the
municipalities] will not employ any enforcement measures," apparently
tacitly absolving the municipalities from any liability that could
otherwise extend from their independent decision not to enact and
enforce their own regulation.8 6 Therefore, under the Eleventh Circuit
decision, the best assumption appears to be that the "primary" regulator
(one with the power and duty to enact such regulations) shoulders full
responsibility.
Under this logic, the federal government's duty to enforce the
ESA is significant. Since the federal government passed the ESA and has
the primary and non-discretionary responsibility to enforce it, s 7 the
federal government is the entity that best fits the description of the
"primary" regulator. Such a finding would be further supported by the
Supremacy Clause, which would require federal regulations
promulgated under a federal power to trump any state or local
regulations. 88 Thus, applying the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning, at least
some-and likely all-of the liability arising from these regulations
would belong to the federal government, not the county government. 89
In summary, the "exclusive" or "primary" nature of Volusia
County's regulatory power is key to the Eleventh Circuit's finding of
84. See generally id.; see also Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 92
F. Supp. 2d 1296 (M.D. Fla. 2000). However, the Secretary of the Interior was added as a
defendant. See id.
85. Loggerhead Turtle, 148 F.3d at 1249. The argument for a duty likely stems from the
use of the word "shall" in the charter. Volusia County, Fla., Home Rule Charter, art. II, §
202.4.
86. 148 F.3d at 1250.
87. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(C)(iii) (2000).
88. But see Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Philip Morris, Inc. v.
Harshbarger, 122 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 1997).
89. Before the circuit court cases finding state and local government liability for
insufficiently protective regulation regimes, at least one commentator suggested that, while
the federal government lacks none of the constitutional authority needed to protect
endangered species and biodiversity more generally, it does on a practical level lack the
ability to exercise that authority and therefore requires state and local government
participation to reach its policy goals. A. Dan Tarlock, Biodiversity Federalism, 54 MD. L. REV.
1315, 1331 (1995).
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standing in the plaintiff's suit against the County, because the court
found entities without such power were excused from liability for their
regulatory action (or lack thereof). However, it was an error to find that
Volusia County's power was exclusive, or even that it was "primary,"
given the power of the federal government (and arguably the state
government) to regulate in this area. Because the nature of the power
was key in determining whether or not a county was liable for "causing"
an injury, this error as to the nature of the County's power propagated
an erroneous finding of standing against Volusia County.
COMMANDEERING AND REDRESSABILITY
Even if a court could find that state and local governments
violated the ESA by promulgating insufficiently stringent regulations, it
is unclear what remedy would be constitutional. Most often, when
statutes are found to conflict with the U.S. Constitution or federal law,
they are invalidated, hence, the doctrine of severability. 90 However,
courts finding vicarious liability have chosen different and more
constitutionally questionable remedies. In Strahan v. Coxe, the court did
not simply invalidate the Massachusetts regulations that were
inadequate or find that the appropriate federal agency had a duty to
promulgate more protective regulations. The court chose instead to
require Massachusetts to prepare a proposal, through a working group,
for how the permit system could be altered so that it would no longer
permit takes. 91 In Loggerhead Turtle, the Eleventh Circuit cited the
remedy given in Strahan as an example of permissible relief.92 In United
States v. Town of Plymouth, the court's injunction ordered the town to
monitor piping plovers and to close areas of a beach to non-essential off-
road vehicles during the plovers' reproductive season.93
To stress the unusual nature of the remedy in Strahan, imagine
that, instead of striking down the regulatory interpretation at issue in
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers94 and leaving the administrative agencies free to use their own
machinery to develop a new one consistent with the Court's mandates,
the Supreme Court had instead required the Army Corps of Engineers to
90. This is the same approach reflected in the provision in the ESA calling for
nullification of any state laws that are inconsistent with the Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 1535(f)
(2000).
91. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 158 (1st Cir. 1997).
92. Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 148 F.3d 1231, 1252 (11th
Cir. 1998).
93. 6 F. Supp. 2d 81, Attachment A (D. Mass 1998).
94. 531 U.S. 159, 162 (2001).
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prepare a proposal, to be submitted to the Court for approval, for
reworked regulations via a judicially mandated working group. In other
words, the court in Strahan was not just telling the state where it was out
of line and voiding that part of the regulation; it was requiring the State
to regulate a specific outcome and mandating court oversight of the
process of reaching that outcome. In doing so, the First Circuit created a
situation where "failure or refusal to establish the mandated program
subjects the States to civil enforcement proceedings," and thus to the
contempt power of the court.95
This is the description of a program that caused the Fifth Circuit
to find a violation of the Tenth Amendment,96 and there is Supreme
Court jurisprudence stressing that states must be permitted to withdraw
from regulating. 97 Thus, the most obvious constitutional problem with
these remedies is that they impermissibly commandeer the states'
governmental processes. 98
Two Supreme Court cases largely establish the contours of the
commandeering doctrine: New York v. United States,99 which dealt with
commandeering of state governments, and Printz v. United States,100
which dealt with commandeering of local governments. New York held
that the "Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program." 101 It also found that requiring
states to enact an acceptable regulatory regime or take title to low-level
nuclear waste did not give the states a sufficient choice as to whether or
95. See ACORN v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387, 1394 (5th Cir. 1996).
96. Koog v. United States, 79 F.3d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 1996) (impermissible
commandeering occurs "either by forcing the States to administer a federal regulatory
program or by compelling the States to enact state legislation according to a federal
formula").
97. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 766-67 (1982). In that case, the court noted
that this is true even when there is no federal program in place to step into the gap.
98. The defendants in Strahan v. Coxe also argued that the court could only strike
regulations under limitations imposed by the Ex Parte Young doctrine. 127 F.3d at 166. See
generally Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Arguing that the Ex Parte Young doctrine
limits the court's ability to issue relief except "to halt" violations of federal law, they
claimed the court could therefore only strike the statute, not mandate a process for future
repairs. The court responded to this argument by stating that Ex Parte Young stands as a
jurisdictional limit on the type of relief that can issue (equitable versus legal) but does not
limit the type of equitable relief the court can issue. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 166-67
(1st Cir. 1997). The First Circuit also noted that the statute itself did not limit the equitable
relief available. Id. at 170.
99. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
100. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
101. 505 U.S. at 188. This is contrasted with the ability of Congress to subject the states
to generally applicable laws, which is permissible. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). A requirement to regulate cannot be a generally
applicable law because private individuals cannot regulate.
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not to regulate, because the state was required to take responsibility for
the waste in either case. 10 2 In Printz, which invalidated a provision of the
Brady Bill requiring county officials to perform background checks until
a federal system could be implemented, the majority expressed concern
that a law requiring county officials to stand between a gun purchaser
and immediate possession of his gun would turn the county official into
a puppet for a "ventriloquist" Congress 10 3 and destroy the checks
inherent in concurrent state and federal authority.1° 4
Arguably, the commandeering issue that Loggerhead Turtle raises
is sufficiently different from the one in Printz to be considered as yet
undecided by the Supreme Court. Unlike the counties in Printz, Volusia
County was not prohibited by the State from issuing the regulations
required by federal law; Volusia had the State of Florida's permission to
regulate beaches and to protect turtles.105 Printz specifically reserved the
question of whether the commandeering of local governments would
occur if the local government entity had the permission of the state to
regulate in the area or was commanded by the state to do so.
10 6
However, New York certainly applies to Strahan v. Coxe's command to
Massachusetts, and the First Circuit addressed the case squarely in its
opinion.
In Strahan v. Coxe, the First Circuit stressed that, because the
defendants were not being ordered to "take positive steps," the remedy
did not commandeer the state process. 10 7 The panel went on to explain
that, because no affirmative steps were required, it implicitly recognized
the state's option to decline to regulate, and, hence, the court did not
violate the prohibitions laid out in New York.108 The lack of requirement
of affirmative steps, however, is in the eye of the beholder. The
injunction upheld by the First Circuit in Strahan v. Coxe, instead of
simply striking the state's regulation, required the state to form a
working group and develop a proposal for fixing the regulations. In
addition, Loggerhead Turtle relied on Strahan v. Coxe in discussing the
remedies that were constitutionally permissible under the comman-
deering doctrine; yet, it is also cited by commentators as the first case
imposing a duty to manage instead of to refrain from acting on behalf of
102. New York, 505 U.S. at 176-77.
103. Printz, 521 U.S. at 928.
104. Id. at 919-20.
105. The state's granting of authority to the counties to regulate such items stems from
the Constitution and is illustrated by the guidance the state issued on the topic. Butler,
supra note 75, at 423-24.
106. Printz, 521 U.S. at 934 n.18.
107. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 170 (1997).
108. Id.
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endangered species.109 Thus, the First Circuit required the county to set
up an entire regulatory process, while claiming it had not required the
county to take affirmative steps.
In answering the argument that the Strahan v. Coxe ruling
appeared to impose requirements of affirmative actions on state
government, the First Circuit offered a second argument that its order
did not impermissibly commandeer Massachusetts' government. Noting
that, in New York and Printz, the state and local governmental entities
were not found to be in violation of a federal statute, the First Circuit
suggested that the equitable powers of the court were not invoked in
those cases, in contrast to the vicarious liability cases. o10 This argument is
problematic because it assumes that the posture of the case was crucial in
both New York and Printz- specifically, that the state or local
government had to challenge the regulation before the federal
government took action to force them to comply. Otherwise, those
defendants would also have been subject to the court's equitable powers,
because they would have violated a federal statute by failing to execute
mandatory duties or take title to property. However, the decisions in the
commandeering cases are based on the unconstitutionality of statutory
provisions requiring affirmative actions from state and local
governments in the first instance; the unconstitutionality of requiring
them to take affirmative action would remove any authority to use the
equity power.11'
One commentator, Ellen D. Katz, offers the view that the Tenth
Amendment does not prohibit Congress from requiring states to take
affirmative actions; it instead prohibits Congress from requiring the
states to regulate the conduct of third parties. Katz additionally posits
that when a state chooses to regulate in an arena where federal law
exists, the state should be required to implement federal law as well,
because to do otherwise would be to discriminate against the federal
laws that are also part of the state's legal systemn 2 Drawing from a
series of cases that hold that state courts must hear federal law claims
when they have jurisdiction over analogous state law claims, Katz argues
that the same is true for applying federal law where states have officials
109. Fred Bosselman, What Lawmakers Can Learn from Large-Scale Ecology, 17 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 207, 306 (2002); Shannon Petersen, Note, Endangered Species in the Urban Jungle:
How the ESA Will Reshape American Cities, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 423, 434 (2000).
110. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d at 169-71.
111. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 179 (1992).
112. Ellen D. Katz, State Judges, State Officers, and Federal Commands After Seminole Tribe
and Printz, 1998 WIs. L. REV. 1465, 1499-1501.
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applying analogous state law. 13  Under this theory, because
Massachusetts and Volusia County chose to attempt to prevent harm to
dolphins and sea turtles, they are liable for failures to follow federal law
in doing so (although neither would be liable if it chose to cease
protecting the species altogether).
Adoption of Katz' theory may pose practical problems in that
states may choose not to protect the environment in particular ways or
will abandon other arenas of regulation entirely.1 4 Legally, the theory
also has pitfalls. First of all, such a requirement would make every
federal law a potential unfunded mandate for states, who would
automatically be required to implement all laws (such as those impacting
education) if they regulated in a certain area at all. Congress has paid a
great deal of attention to unfunded mandates since the 1990s, and
nothing in those debates suggests that Congress believed every law it
passed with an enforcement component was potentially an unfunded
mandate for all states to implement. Secondly, such a requirement might
be viewed as states usurping powers explicitly delegated to the executive
branch of the federal government by the U.S. Constitution: if states were
automatically required to enforce federal law if they had any state
regulations in the area, that would split the authority to ensure that the
laws are faithfully executed between the president and 50 governors and
countless mayors and county councils. Congress's ability to force state
governments to enforce a law in a particular fashion could provide an
avenue for Congress to usurp executive authority by finding other
executors for the laws it passes.
Finally, the structure of other statutory regimes, notably the
Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act, seems inapposite with Katz'
theory. In those regimes, the federal government is required to assume
regulatory authority in states that do not sufficiently protect the
113. Some state laws have been interpreted by courts to block state and local agencies
from aiding the federal government in its efforts to enforce the ESA. See Ass'n of Wash.
Bus. v. Washington, SHB No. 00-037, 2001 WL 1022097 (Wash. Shore Hrg. Bd. 2001);
William Snape et al., Protecting Ecosystems Under the ESA: The Sonoran Desert Example, 41
WASHBURN L. REV. 14, 39 (2001) (citing S. Ariz. Homebuilders Ass'n v. Huckleberry, No.
C-2001 (Ariz. Sup. Ct., Pima County, May 23,2001).
114. Those who argue that this is unlikely should consider the potential response of a
state like Idaho, whose annual budget is approximately $1.7 billion dollars, when told that
if it chose to pass any environmental regulations that impacted the mining industry, and
any mining resulted in a Superfund-level cleanup like the one currently ongoing, the state
would be liable for cleanup and damages of approximately $1.4 billion. It is almost certain
the state would choose to abandon any attempt to regulate mining rather than risk such
severe liability. See supra note 54. On a smaller level, the costs of likely litigation may cause
localities to decide to exit a regulatory arena altogether rather than devote a noticeable
percentage of their budget to litigation costs.
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environment under federal standards. If Katz' theory were accepted, the
mere passing of statutes would automatically require states to
themselves regulate according to federal law. Therefore, if Congress
followed this theory, it would create a strong disincentive for the states
to regulate any field, and would thereby create a heavy responsibility for
the federal government both to regulate in a number of areas where
there would be a governmental vacuum and to shoulder a much heavier
enforcement burden than it currently has. When stated this way, the
revolutionary nature of Katz' argument becomes apparent; in her view,
those provisions of the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Acts are
understood as a rare avoidance by states of an unfunded federal
mandate to change their regulations. Certainly, this is not how these
laws are normally understood, either by Congress or by the legal
community.
In New York v. United States, one of the reasons the Supreme
Court found commandeering to be a danger to the governmental system
was the potential to decrease the accountability of the federal
government for federal decisions. "[W]here the Federal government
directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the
brunt of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the
regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision."115 Similarly, in Printz, the Court
expressed fears that state and local governments "would be put in the
position of taking the blame for [the law's] burdensomeness and its
defects."1 1 6 The degree to which vicarious liability makes these concerns
reality is best illustrated by the 1998 case of United States v. Town of
Plymouth.
In Plymouth, the use of off-road vehicles threatened the habitat
and feeding of the piping plover, an endangered species. The U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service knew of the threat and issued non-binding guidance
on how to avoid taking the plover. The guidance included recommen-
dations to close part of the beach to off-road vehicles.11 7 However, the
Service did not go through the rulemaking process to issue binding
regulations. Restrictions on beach use proved to be hugely unpopular
with the Plymouth community, resulting in several heated public
meetings, a petition drive, and the firing of one city official (who was
hanged in effigy by protesting citizens) who attempted to implement the
non-binding federal guidance. 118 In response to the local council's
115. New York, 505 U.S. at 169.
116. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930 (1997).
117. United States v. Town of Plymouth, 6 F. Supp. 2d 81, 85-86 (D. Mass. 1998).
118. Id. at 88.
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unwillingness to comply with the non-binding guidance, the USFWS
filed a motion for a preliminary injunction in federal court requiring
them to do so.'1 9 The injunction was granted. 120
The outcome in Plymouth is startling for two reasons: first,
unlike the facts in Strahan and Loggerhead Turtle, local and state officials
were present while the birds were harassed by individuals driving on
the beach, so the direct actors were identifiable and immediate
enforcement of the ESA against those actors would have prevented harm
to the piping plover. Secondly, a federal agency with the power to
promulgate regulations of its own12 ' had chosen to protect wildlife not
through issuing regulations, but by asking a court to compel a local
government to implement guidance that was officially non-binding. Both
aspects of the case are problematic. First, for policy reasons, vicarious
liability seems much less necessary in Plymouth as a last-ditch attempt to
provide deterrence, because the direct actors were easily identifiable by
the government. In other words, one of the better arguments for
governmental liability for regulation or the lack thereof is that in cases
where the third party violators are not easily identified, there is still a
way to increase deterrence. 122 Plymouth is remarkable because there was
an obvious way to deter destruction of the plover habitat: individuals
harassing the birds in the presence of governmental authorities could
have been punished. This case therefore demonstrates that vicarious
liability is not limited in its use to cases in which no other deterrence is
possible. Instead, it is used in place of direct liability for identifiable
individuals actually committing takes when it is practically easier-or
politically easier -to reach their behavior via state and local government
liability.123 This is an odd policy choice for agencies required to protect
endangered species, because it selects lower levels of deterrence
(through passing regulations that give the threat of punishment) over
higher levels of deterrence (direct punishment of individuals causing
harm).
Second, the nature of the injunction was essentially to order the
town government to comply with non-binding federal guidance. Where
a federal agency has chosen to issue non-binding guidance instead of a
119. Id. at 89.
120. Id.
121. The Act even authorizes the federal agency to issue emergency regulations that
become effective immediately. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(7) (2000).
122. Ruhl, supra note 1 (citing this situation as the most attractive one for use of
vicarious liability); see also supra note 78.
123. Michael J. Bean, Major Endangered Species Act Developments in 2000, 31 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,283, 10, 285-86 (2001) (arguing increased practicality for influencing individual
actions).
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binding rule, the court's enforcement of the guidance as if it were a rule
arguably usurped the delegated powers of Congress and violated the Act
it is purportedly enforcing by creating an alternative rulemaking path to
the one specified by statute. By requiring the town to enforce an
extremely unpopular law, Plymouth is the manifestation of the fear
expressed in commandeering jurisprudence that the federal government
will attempt to cloak its responsibility for unpopular laws by forcing the
states or local governments to be the visible enforcers. The prescience of
that fear is demonstrated by Plymouth, because one of the examples of
recalcitrant behavior the court cited was the town's insistence that it
would not close the beach until the federal or state government required
it in writing. 124 By finding this request to be obstructionist in nature, the
court was penalizing the local government for attempting to create some
degree of accountability for the entities truly calling the shots. This
seems all the more unreasonable since the town officials could only point
to supposedly non-binding guidance to justify their unpopular local
actions.
The actions of the federal government in Plymouth, the strong
negative local reaction to federal mandates, and the attempt by the
federal government to place the blame for those mandates on the local
government's shoulders justify the Supreme Court's fears that
commandeering poses risks to our governmental system. Plymouth also
illustrates how easily the doctrine of vicarious liability falls prey to the
worst of these concerns. Such a demonstration calls into question the
constitutionality of remedies like those in Strahan v. Coxe and Loggerhead
Turtle, where the requirement that governments undertake affirmative
action is less blatant, but hardly absent.
CONCLUSION
The recent cases finding vicarious liability for state and local
governments under the ESA are not exceptional or isolated incidents:
other vicarious liability cases are pending in the courts. 125 Some of those
cases continue to push to extend the boundaries of current vicarious
liability jurisprudence. For instance, the State of Florida recently settled a
case focused on the regulation of boat speed, 126 despite the fact that
124. Town of Plymouth, 6 F. Supp. 2d at 91.
125. See, e.g., Pac. Rivers Council v. Brown, Civ. No. 02-00243-BR (D. Or. Apr. 21, 2003)
(surviving a motion to dismiss). For a discussion of other pending cases, see Steven P.
Quarles & Thomas R. Lundquist, The Endangered Species Act of 1973: Origins, Requirements,
and Issues, SGO06 ALI-ABA 589, 603 (2002).
126. Ruhl, supra note 1.
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federally sanctioned activities were also permitted by the speed limit
regulation, and there was precedent in case law indicating boat licensing
would not result in vicarious liability because it more closely
approximated licensing of cars. 127 Because vicarious liability cases can be
prohibitively expensive for localities to fight, it is likely that more
settlements will occur and local authorities will be forced to implement
federal policies more often.128 Such a result should alarm not only
advocates of local and state government sovereignty, but also those who
seek maximum deterrence from harming endangered species. Because
governments may face liability even for promulgating regulations
intended to curtail currently damaging activities, states and local
governments may have an incentive not to open the door to those suits
by attempting to regulate where they otherwise would1 29
Finally, as Plymouth shows, vicarious liability has been used as
little more than a shell game. In one sense, it is a shell game because the
harm created by individuals or third parties is encased in a protective
shell of state or local government liability. In another sense, it is also a
shell game for federal authority. Instead of spending federal resources
(pursuant to federal authority) promulgating politically unpopular
regulations to protect endangered species, the federal government may
issue non-binding guidance as in Plymouth or even expressly decline to
enact a prohibition on the use of equipment as in Strahan v. Coxe and
then use vicarious liability theories to force the local government to put
their own patina on it. This creates a real difficulty for constituents trying
to determine which governmental entity is responsible for the regulation:
the local government, which was the first entity to make such regulations
binding law, or the federal government, which did not make such
regulations binding law but sued the local government to force them to
do so. Such a game is not simply confusing; it undermines the basis for
representative government. Under that weight, the shell should crack -
and soon.
127. Cf. Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997), with Strahan v. Linnon, 187 F. 3d
623 (1st Cir. 1998).
128. Alan M. Glen & Craig M. Douglas, Taking Species: Difficult Questions of Proximity
and Degree, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT 65, 132 (2001). Localities may also end up bearing
the costs of litigation, even if they eventually change their regulations unilaterally. Jennifer
A. Mogy, Recent Developments in Environmental Law, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 231, 240-41 (2002).
129. Robert L. Fischman & Jaelith Hall-Rivera, A Lesson for Conservation from Pollution
Control Law: Cooperative Federalism for Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 27 COLUM.
J. ENVTL. L. 45, 87 (2002). Even developing a habitat conservation plan that permits takes
may be beyond the reach of some local governments because of the resources needed.
Madeline June Kass, Threatened Extinction of Plain Vanilla 4(d) Rules, 16 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 78, 81 (2001).
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